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FeatureThe fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-5), to be published in May, will include highly controversial changes. 
Some diagnoses have been broadened to include a range of behaviours 
hitherto considered normal. As the coverage of mental disorder diagnoses 
increases, is there any space left for normal biological variability in human 
behaviour? Michael Gross investigates. 
Has the manual gone mental? Imaginary maladies: As the extent of illnesses described in diagnostic manuals such as the 
DSM tends to increase from one edition to the next, critics question the usefulness of new 
diagnoses. Hypochondriacs with significant somatic symptoms, such as the imaginary invalid 
in Molière’s famous play, will from now on fall under the new category of somatic symptom 
disorder (SSD). (Painting by Honoré Daumier, from Wikimedia commons.)One day in February 1683, Jean-
Baptiste Poquelin, known to the 
world by his stage name Molière, fell 
ill while he was on stage playing the 
“imaginary invalid”, the protagonist 
of his last play, whose main health 
problem was the imagination and 
incompetence of his doctors. The 
playwright was taken to his home 
where he died a few hours later. 
Much as the audience watching 
Molière’s last stage appearance 
wouldn’t have been able to tell that 
he was in real suffering while playing 
the hypochondriac he invented, it is 
sometimes difficult to tease apart 
what is just on the mind (of the 
patient or the doctor) and what is 
a real disease and a danger to the 
patient. This is especially problematic 
for maladies of the mind, whose 
diagnoses depend both on the 
representation that patients project 
of their mental processes and on the 
medical profession’s definition of 
what counts as a normal mind. 
Thus, it is perhaps not surprising 
that the preparations for the fifth 
edition of the most widely used 
source for psychiatric diagnoses, the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), have 
sparked lively discussions in the 
profession and in the wider media. 
After all, by moving the goalposts 
for mental disorders, the 158 experts 
preparing the manual on behalf of 
the American Psychiatric Association 
(APA) may make patients of millions 
of people who were hitherto 
considered normal.  
Since the first edition of the manual 
appeared in 1952, the general 
trend has been one of inflation. The 
fourth edition from 1994 lists 297 
separate disorders, nearly three 
times as many as the first. The fifth 
edition will add new diagnoses and 
broaden the criteria for some, fuelling 
criticism that experts are inventing 
new disorders like the physicians in Molière’s play. However, the APA 
has asserted that the total number 
of diagnoses included in the manual 
will be comparable to the previous 
edition, as some diagnoses have 
also been dropped or merged. Still, 
changes to diagnostic criteria may 
lead to larger numbers of people 
being diagnosed with mental 
disorders.
Body and mind
One of the controversial changes 
affects imaginary invalids along with 
patients having knock-on effects 
from serious chronic disease. Where 
the somatoform disorders section 
in the fourth edition of the manual 
distinguished between four specific 
categories (somatisation disorder, hypochondriasis, pain disorder, 
and undifferentiated somatoform 
disorder), the new version will replace 
these with the single category 
somatic symptom disorder (SSD), 
which will be part of a wider section 
on related disorders. 
While in the old definition medically 
unexplained symptoms were the key 
criterion for the diagnosis of somatic 
disorders, the new category shifts 
the focus to psychological impact 
of bodily symptoms on the patient’s 
thoughts and behaviours.
Critics fear that this shift and the 
loosened diagnostic criteria for this 
new category will sweep up millions 
of patients who have a real chronic 
disease and just ‘worry too much’ 
about it. Suzy Chapman, a patient 
advocate from Dorset, UK, wrote on 
her website http://dxrevisionwatch.
com: “If approved, these proposals 
will license the application of a 
mental health diagnosis for all 
illnesses — whether ‘established 
general medical conditions or 
Current Biology Vol 23 No 8
R296
Alcohol problems: One of the changes introduced in DSM-5 is that alcohol abuse and alcohol 
dependence are merged into a single category — alcohol use disorder. While a scientific study 
suggests this will make little difference, some concerns have been expressed that it will stig-
matise patients with early stage alcohol problems. (Image: istockphotos.)disorders’ like diabetes, heart disease 
and cancer or conditions presenting 
with ‘somatic symptoms of unclear 
etiology’ — if the clinician considers 
the patient is devoting too much 
time to their symptoms and that 
their life has become ‘subsumed’ by 
health concerns and preoccupations, 
or their response to distressing 
somatic symptoms is ‘excessive’ or 
‘disproportionate,’ or their coping 
strategies ‘maladaptive’. These are 
highly subjective clinical judgements.”
In defence of their change, the SSD 
work group chaired by Joel Dimsdale, 
an emeritus at the University of 
California at San Diego, argued that 
the old categories were flawed and 
unpopular among practitioners and 
thus rarely used. Chapman argues 
that these categories should have 
been considered for deletion, rather 
than being merged into a too broadly 
defined catch-all category. 
Specifically, Chapman is concerned 
that the bar for what used to be 
categorised as somatisation disorder, 
which required eight criteria to be 
met according to the fourth edition, 
is lowered to just one or two boxes to 
be ticked. Apart from unnecessarily 
labelling patients with psychiatric 
diagnoses on top of their physical 
illnesses, Chapman also worries that 
the new diagnosis could do actual harm, for instance by discouraging 
patients from reporting additional 
symptoms, or by making it more likely 
that physicians don’t take symptoms 
seriously. 
“The introduction of the somatic 
symptom disorder construct 
represents a radical departure from 
the existing DSM categories yet there 
is no significant body of evidence to 
support the validity, reliability and 
safety of its application in adults 
and children with diverse, chronic 
illnesses,” says Chapman.
Duke University emeritus Allen 
Frances, who chaired the task force 
that prepared DSM-IV (note that the 
APA switched from Roman to Arabic 
numerals since then), supports 
Chapman’s criticism. In January, 
after the final revision meeting 
before publication of the fifth edition 
failed to address the criticism, he 
summarised the problem thus: 
“SSD is defined so over inclusively 
by DSM-5 that it will mislabel 1 in 
6 people with cancer and heart 
disease; 1 in 4 with irritable bowel 
and fibromyalgia; and 1 in 14 who are 
not even medically ill.” More recently, 
Frances also published a summary of 
the arguments against the changes 
to the SSD diagnoses in an academic 
journal (BMJ (2013), 346, doi: 
10.1136/bmj.f1580).Ten things I hate about you
Not that the somatic symptom 
disorders have been the only 
battlefield in the preparation for the 
DSM-5. In a blog entry published 
last December, after the APA’s 
board of trustees approved the final 
manuscript for the new edition, Allen 
Frances listed an additional “ten 
changes that make no sense”. 
One of them is the category 
‘disruptive mood dysregulation 
disorder’, which appears in the 
section on depressive disorders. 
This new diagnosis, says Frances, 
might turn toddler tantrums into 
psychiatric conditions. “We have 
no idea whatever how this untested 
new diagnosis will play out in real 
life practice settings, but my fear is 
that it will exacerbate, not relieve, the 
already excessive and inappropriate 
use of medication in young children,” 
he wrote. 
Frances’ list includes other 
everyday occurrences that are now 
at risk of getting a psychiatric label 
thanks to DSM-5, including normal 
grief after bereavement and harmless 
forgetfulness in advanced age. Also, 
if you worry too much, you might fall 
into generalised anxiety disorder, 
and if you eat too much once a week 
for at least three months, you might 
qualify for a diagnosis of binge eating 
disorder. 
Some of the categories that 
Frances has criticised relate to 
timely issues. For instance, the new 
diagnosis of adult attention deficit 
disorder (AADD) may be read as an 
invitation for health professionals to 
prescribe cognitive enhancers such 
as modafinil or methylphenidate to 
adults hitherto considered healthy. 
Supporters of cognitive enhancement 
may welcome this development, but 
others will watch it more critically, 
as the bioethical issues attached 
to cognitive enhancers remain 
unresolved. 
Similarly, Frances is concerned that 
the manual paves the way “to make a 
mental disorder of everything we like 
to do a lot.”  Both internet addiction 
and sex addiction were considered 
for inclusion, but only internet gaming 
disorder made it into the final section 
of the manual under “conditions for 
further study.” 
Nevertheless, Frances worries that 
the manual will reinforce a general 
trend towards widening the realm of 
psychiatric diagnoses and thereby 
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Deadly sins: Doing too much of what we fancy can lead us into trouble, but should it be cate-
gorised as a mental disorder? Allegory of Gluttony, by Hieronymus Bosch / http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Allegory_of_Gluttony_and_Lustnarrowing down the definition of 
normal behaviour. He has further 
explored these developments in a 
forthcoming book, Saving Normal, 
which is due to appear in May, just 
ahead of DSM-5. “My concern is 
that diagnosing the worried well 
diverts attention from the really 
sick. Redefining everyday problems 
as mental disorder underestimates 
human resiliency; burdens the 
individual with harmful medication 
and stigma; narrows personal 
horizons; costs a fortune; and creates 
the false sense we are a sick society,” 
Frances says. 
Mergers and acquisitions
Another hotly contested issue during 
the preparation of the new edition 
was the old definition of gender 
identity disorder, which essentially 
defines transgender people as 
mentally ill. Transgender activists 
have campaigned for the removal of 
this category. The name disappeared, 
but the phenomenon remains covered 
under the new category name gender 
dysphoria, so the activists will 
probably not get what they wanted.
Other changes have been less 
controversial. For instance, the old 
categories of alcohol abuse and 
alcohol dependence have been 
merged into the new alcohol use 
disorder (AUD). Among the diagnostic 
criteria, ‘legal problems’ is set to 
disappear, while ‘craving’ makes a 
new entry. 
In a systematic study, Alexis 
Edwards and colleagues at the 
Virginia Commonwealth University 
School of Medicine tested the old 
diagnoses against the new one, only 
leaving out the ‘craving’ criterion as 
the existing medical records contain 
insufficient data on that aspect. 
The research found that the number 
of people diagnosed with alcohol 
problems will be unaffected by the 
changes. While the researchers 
found no clear evidence that the new 
system will improve the accuracy of 
diagnoses, it doesn’t seem to make 
things worse either. 
“One of the key findings is that 
the prevalence of the new diagnosis, 
AUD, is unlikely to be much higher 
than the prevalences we’ve seen for 
abuse and dependence combined,” 
Edwards said in a press statement. 
“Another key finding is that the 
genetic etiology of the new diagnosis 
is almost entirely consistent with that of the current diagnoses. Familial 
aggregation is an important validator 
for psychiatric problems, and our 
findings indicate that the genetic risk 
captured by AA and AD diagnoses is 
also captured by the modified AUD 
diagnosis we used. Finally, our results 
suggest that the removal of the legal 
problems criterion is unlikely to 
adversely affect diagnostic validity as 
that criterion does not appear to be 
contributing anything critical to the 
current diagnosis.”
Another merger will see the 
disappearance of Asperger syndrome 
as a separate category, which will 
be included into the broader autism 
spectrum disorder category. While 
this definition corresponds to the 
observations suggesting that autistic 
disorders occur on a broad spectrum 
and all division into sub-categories 
would be arbitrary to a certain extent, 
some have expressed worries that the single category will lead to the 
narrowing of diagnosis and hence 
to a loss of specialist support 
for patients on the fringes of the 
spectrum. 
One phenomenon conspicuously 
absent from the diagnostic categories 
is self-harm. It is relegated to the 
last section of the manual, under 
“conditions for further study.”
Competing interests 
Press coverage during the 
preparations for DSM-5 has flagged 
up the fundamental conflicts 
of interest that haunt the field. 
Understandably, psychiatrists who 
investigate a hitherto unappreciated 
mental problem will lobby to get 
their hobby horse into the manual. 
Moreover, the pharmaceutical 
industry has a natural interest in 
widening the patient population, as 
this will boost their sales. Through 
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flies and their allies probably rank as 
the least appreciated insects on the 
planet. No surprise, then, that when it 
came to tormenting people, the Lord’s 
weapon of choice has been flies. A 
contributing factor to the poor standing 
of flies is surely their disposition 
for breeding in and feeding on 
decaying matter, particularly in things 
considered unclean by humans. For 
us, flies represent the very antithesis 
to cleanliness and health. Coming up 
with ways of getting rid of flies has 
thus been a preoccupation throughout 
human history. 
In light of their bad repute, the 
notion of an opulently illustrated 
coffee table book focusing on 
flies may seem odd. But this is 
exactly what Stephen Marshall has 
accomplished. Weighing in at 2.5 kg, 
Flies: The Natural History and Diversity 
of Diptera, is a monster of a book, in 
which flies (and their allies) are finally 
given the veneration they rightly 
deserve. In contrast to prior tomes 
devoted to the Diptera, which have 
all been rather dreary affairs targeted 
towards taxonomists, Marshall’s Flies 
is a colorful account of all things fly 
that will appeal to specialists, non-
specialists and laymen alike. The text 
is accessibly written and the author’s 
evident affection and fascination for 
his subjects are evident throughout 
the book’s 600 pages. But what really 
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“And the Lord did so; and there came a 
grievous swarm of flies into the house 
of Pharaoh, and into his servants’ 
houses, and into all the land of Egypt: 
the land was corrupted by reason of 
the swarm of flies.” Exodus 8:24
Flies have a bad reputation. And not 
wholly unwarranted. Many Diptera (the 
taxonomic term for flies, mosquitoes, 
midges, gnats and other two-winged 
insects) not only bite, suck blood and 
generally annoy, but they also transmit 
deadly diseases, of which malaria is a 
prime example. The annual death toll 
from fly-carried sicknesses count in the 
millions. As if that was not enough, flies 
can also be destructive agricultural 
pests, such as the Mediterranean 
fruit fly, which, thanks to its voracious 
appetite for fruit, inflicts tremendous 
damage. Together with cockroaches, 
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Figure 1. The fly curse.
Flies’ penchant for filth and blood, and their ability to spread diseases have cemented this 
group of insect’s poor reputation. Left, Beelzebub, chief demon of hell, and “Lord of the flies”. 
Top right, black blow flies (Phormia regina) drawn to the carrion smell of a stinkhorn fungus. 
Below, a Sabethes tarsopus mosquito — a yellow fever vector — enjoying a blood meal. 
Photographs by Stephen A. Marshall.medical professionals who act as 
consultants for companies, the 
industry may try to influence the 
revision of diagnostic criteria in its 
favour. Given that introduction of new 
or substantially altered diagnostic 
criteria could lead to drug treatments 
for millions of patients in the long 
term, one could argue that such 
changes should undergo clinical trials 
following the same strict rules as 
those for new drugs. 
Given these fundamental 
problems, one might already count 
it as a success if the inflation in 
the number of diagnoses from one 
edition to the next has now been 
stopped. Still, the broadening 
of diagnostic criteria, leading to 
a wider group of patients being 
diagnosed, remains a concern for 
many, especially if the criteria set 
by the APA get exported and have 
a knock-on effect on the WHO’s 
disease manual ICD-11 (International 
Classification of Diseases), due to 
be released by 2015. Chapman and 
Frances are concerned that the 
new definition of SSD will also be 
reflected in ICD-11. “ICD-11 is field 
testing a new category — ‘Bodily 
Distress Disorder’ — proposed to 
replace six or seven existing ICD-
10 somatoform disorders, which, 
according to working group reports 
on emerging proposals, mirrors the 
DSM-5 somatic symptom disorder 
definition,” says Chapman.
The trend towards a narrowing 
definition of ‘normal’ in psychiatry 
may also reflect wider trends in 
society, often set in the US and 
exported globally. “I think the 
scientifically unjustified widening of 
psychiatric diagnosis reflects in part 
the Facebook mentality of promoting 
conformity, perfectionism, and 
intolerance for individual difference — 
as well as reflecting the greed of Big 
Pharma which will be satisfied only 
when every man, woman, and child is 
taking a psychiatric pill,” says Allen 
Frances. 
If these trends are allowed to 
continue, those of us who still haven’t 
been diagnosed with a mental 
disorder may have to fight to cling 
on to this normality, to avoid getting 
into a farcical situation like Molière’s 
imaginary invalid. 
Michael Gross is a science writer based at 
Oxford. He can be contacted via his web 
page at www.michaelgross.co.uk
